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CASE NOTES 
Administrative Law-FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT: EXEMPTION 
5-INFORMATION CONCERNING GROUNDS FOR SOME RENEGOTIATION 
BOARD ECISIONS MADE UNAVAILABLE-Renegotiation Board v. 
Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp., 421 U.S. 168 (1975). 
Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),' Grum- 
man Aircraft Engineering Corporation commenced an action in 
federal district court to compel the Renegotiation Board (the 
Board) to disclose "certain final opinions, orders and identifiable 
records" related to or issued during renegotiation proceedings 
conducted to determine whether "excessive profits" had been 
realized by fourteen companies in their contracts with the Gov- 
ernment during the years 1962-1965.2 The district court denied 
relief? On appeal, the.Court of Appeals for the District of Colum- 
bia reversed and remanded,4 ordering the requested documents to 
be made available after deletion of statutorily protected confiden- 
tial information ." 
The plaintiff, "not satisfied with the documents so dis- 
c l ~ s e d , " ~  moved in the district court for the disclosure of addi- 
tional records, namely, Regional Board reports and Division re- 
ports. These reports had been written to aid the Board in deciding 
whether contractors had realized any excessive profits, and if so, 
to what e ~ t e n t . ~  Although these reports were considered carefully 
by the Board in making its decisions, it was bound neither by 
their reasoning nor their conclusions. Further, even when the 
Board agreed with the recommendation of a report, private par- 
ties had no way of determining whether the report's reasoning was 
adopted. 
The district court found both the Regional Board reports and 
Division reports to be "final opinions" for the purposes of the 
1. 5 U.S.C. 9 552 (1970). The FOIA was enacted in 1966. 
2. 421 U.S. 168, 179 (1975). The plaintiff also sought information concerning its then 
pending renegotiation before the Board. 
3. The first district court order was handed down without opinion. 
4. Grumman Aircraft Eng'r Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 425 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
5. 5 U.S.C. 9 552(b)(4) (1970) exempts from disclosure "trade secrets and commercial 
or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential." 
6. 421 U S .  at 181. 
7. The Board sought to terminate its cases by agreement, as set out in 50 U.S.C. 9 
1215(a) (1970). Regional Board reports and Division reports were generated only upon the 
failure of contractors to reach agreements with the Board. 
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FOIA and ordered their disclosure.VFhe Court of Appeals af- 
f i rmed.The United States Supreme Court reversed,1° finding 
both Regional Board reports and Division reports to be precisely 
the kind of predecisional consultative memoranda exempted from 
disclosure by exemption 5 of the FOIA.ll 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF EXEMPTION 5 OF THE FOIA 
The FOIA was enacted to make certain agency records avail- 
able to the public.I2 It replaced section 3 of the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA),I3 which had been effectively manipulated 
by administrative agencies to "deny legitimate information to the 
public."14 Nevertheless, even under the FOIA, the right of the 
public to agency information is not absolute. Contained in the 
FOIA are nine exemptions which protect certain kinds of docu- 
ments from disclosure. l5 
One of these, exemption 5 ,  allows an agency to withhold 
memoranda or letters that a party could not obtain from the 
agency if sought through the discovery process in civil litigation? 
This exemption has been interpreted to disallow the disclosure of 
advisory memoranda in the interest of protecting the consultative 
functions of government." This interpretation is supported by the 
8. Grumman Aircraft Eng'r Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 325 B. Supp. 1146 (D.D.C. 
1971), aff'd, 482 F.2d 710 (D.C. Cir. 1973), reu'd, 421 U.S. 168 (1975). 
9. 482 F.2d 710 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
10. 421 U.S. 168 (1975). 
11. Id. a t  184. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) exempts "inter-agency or intra-agency memoran- 
dums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in 
litigation with the agency." 
12. The language of the FOIA states that "identifiable records" are to be made 
available to "any person." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970). This replaced the provision of 
section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act limiting disclosure of records to those 
"properly and directly concerned." Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 238. 
13. Id. 
14. S. REP. NO. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965) [hereinafter cited as S. REP.]. 
For a discussion of agency abuse of the public information section of the APA see H.R. 
REP. NO. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1965) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP.]; Note, The 
Freedom of Information Act and the Exemption for Intra-agency Memoranda, 86 HARV. 
L. REV. 1047 n.3 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 86 HARV. L. REV.]. 
15. 5 U.S.C. 4 552(b) (1970). 
16. See, e.g., H.R. REP. 10, S. REP. 9. The U.S. Supreme Court has narrowly inter- 
preted exemption 5, concluding that "the legislative history of Exemption 5 demonstrates 
that Congress intended to incorporate generally the recognized rule that 'confidential 
intra-agency advisory opinions . . . are privileged from inspection.' " EPA v. Mink, 410 
U.S. 73, 86 (1973) (citations omitted). 
17. For a thorough discussion of the privilege within the context of the FOIA see 
NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U S .  132, 150-54 (1975). For a pre-FOIA discussion 
of the privilege see Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318, 324-25 
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notion that government decisions are best made in an open, frank 
atmosphere where opinions may be freely rendered without fear 
of premature public criticism. lR 
The advisory opinion privilege of exemption 5 is limited, 
however, by the well accepted rule that agencies ought to make 
public the general policies applied in dealing with private parties, 
thereby eliminating the possibility that a body of "secret" agency 
law could be created? This rule is manifest in affirmative provi- 
sions of the FOIA requiring disclosure of "final opinions," and 
"statements of policy and interpretations which have been 
adopted by an agency."20 Several policy objectives underlie this 
rule that general agency law must be made public. One is to 
"prevent a citizen from losing a controversy with an agency be- 
cause of some obscure and hidden order or opinion which the 
agency knows about but which has been unavailable to the citizen 
simply because he had no way to discover it? Another objective 
of disclosure is to encourage agency responsibility and accounta- 
b i l i t ~ . ~ ~  In any event, because of the existence of the general rule, 
exemption 5 protects only memoranda that are merely advisory; 
other writings which provide official explanations for agency deci- 
(D.D.C. 1966), aff'd per curium sub nom. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena v. Clark, 384 F.2d 979 
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 952 (1967). 
18. H.R. REP. 10, S. REP. 9. See also 86 HARV. L. REV. 1049; Katz, The Games 
Bureaucrats Play: Hide and Seek Under the Freedom of Information Act, 48 TEXAS L. REV. 
1261, 1275-76 (1970). 
19. In speaking of the broad purpose of the FOIA, one authority has concluded: "The 
governing principle, which I think is without exception, is that secret law is forbidden." 
K. DAVIS, ADMIN~STRATIVE LAWTREATISE § 3A.21, a t  159 (Supp. 1970). See generally Davis, 
The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 797 (1967). 
20. 5 U.S.C. 4 552(a)(2)(A), (B) (1970). It is theoretically possible that a conflict 
could arise between these disclosure requirements and exemption 5 since affirmative 
disclosure provisions of the FOIA do not apply to material exempted by 5 U.S.C. 5 552(b). 
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has concluded that "Exemption 5 does not apply to 
any document which falls within the meaning of the phrase 'final opinion . . . made in 
the adjudication of cases.' " NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. a t  148. That is to 
say, final opinions and memoranda protected by exemption 5 form mutually exclusive 
categories. The reason for this conclusion is that final opinions constitute agency law 
which must be made public and therefore cannot fall under the protective cloak of exemp- 
tion 5. Similarly, the Court would likely find that no statement of policy or interpretation 
adopted by an agency could be classified as  advisory. See 86 HARV. L. REV. 1059; Note, 
The Freedom of Information Act: A Seven-year Assessment, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 895, 936- 
37 (1974). 
21. S. REP. 7. This statement was made concerning the requirement in the FOIA that 
agencies index orders and opinions. Though it did not refer specifically to secret law, it 
does provide reasons for eliminating such law. Compelling agencies to index opinions and 
orders is itself an attempt to prevent the formation of a secret body of law. 
22. See 86 HARV. L. REV. 1059. See generally K. DAVIS, supra note 19, a t  5 3A.11. 
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sions are beyond the scope of the exemption and must be dis- 
closed.23 
I t  is clear that memoranda labeled "final opinions" by agen- 
cies provide official explanations for agency decisions and are not 
protected from disclosure by exemption 5 .  Difficulty in determin- 
ing whether disclosure is in order arises when a memorandum 
initially serves an advisory function but is then adopted, or ap- 
pears to be adopted, by an agency as the official explanation for 
a decision. The first important case dealing with this problem was 
American Mail Line, Ltd. v. G u l i ~ k , ~ ~  where disclosure of a mem- 
orandum was ordered because it had been cited by an agency as 
the sole basis for a de~ision.~Wulick was particularly significant 
in its demonstration that an otherwise privileged memorandum 
would lose its protected status if its reasoning were adopted by 
an agency. Nevertheless, agencies can easily avoid disclosure of 
advisory opinions under the rule of Gulick simply by not citing 
them as bases for decisions. 
This "loophole" was partially eliminated in Sterling Drug v. 
FTC,2%hich reinforced Gulick and also indicated that any me- 
moranda issued by an agency that announce or explain its deci- 
sions must be disclosed, whether labeled by the agency as final 
opinions or The rule of Sterling Drug was expanded in 
NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. ,2R a companion case to the instant 
case. In Sears, private parties sought disclosure of memoranda 
issued by the NLRB's Office of General Counsel to announce and 
explain that office's decisions not to file charges with the NLRB. 
The United States Supreme Court held that because these me- 
moranda explained decisions dispositive of adjudication they 
were final opinions for the purposes of the FOIA and were re- 
quired to be d i s c l ~ s e d . ~ ~  Thus, memoranda issued by an authority 
with final decision-making power within an agency were added to 
those which could not seek shelter under exemption 5 .  
Gulick, Sterling Drug, and Sears are examples of attempts 
by the courts to prevent agencies from invoking exemption 5 with 
23. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 150 (1975). 
24. 411 F.2d 696 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
25. Id. a t  703. "We do not feel that appellee should be required to operate in a 
fishbowl; but by the same token we do not feel that appellants should be required to 
operate in a darkroom." Id. 
26. 450 F.2d 698 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
27. Id. a t  708. 
28. 421 U.S. 132 (1975). 
29. Id. a t  150. 
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a claim that documents containing policy statements are merely 
predecisional consultative memoranda. The courts have been 
cautious, however, not to require disclosure of advisory memo- 
randa unless they clearly contain the reasons for final agency 
decisions. In Sterling Drug, for example, disclosure of certain 
memoranda was denied because they "[did] not necessarily con- 
tain a full and accurate account of the grounds for . . . deci- 
~ ion."~"  In Fisher v. Renegotiation Board,31 the District of Colum- 
bia Court of Appeals, in rejecting a request for disclosure of con- 
sultative memoranda concerned with an announced Board deci- 
sion, stated, "Exemption 5 applies according to the character of 
the memoranda, and not according to their chronological position 
in the decision-making process of which they might have been a 
part."32 These two cases, and others, thus distinguish between 
memoranda that are merely advisory and those that serve to ex- 
plain agency decisions; in making the distinction, the cases focus 
on whether the memoranda a t  issue have in fact been adopted by 
an agency. Before disclosure of disputed memoranda will be or- 
dered, the fact that they express agency policy must be certain. 
Nevertheless, although the courts have made some attempt to 
articulate rules that would allow findings that memoranda have 
been adopted as agency policy without agency statements to that 
effect,33 no court has yet made a determination that a memoran- 
dum provides the basis for an ultimate decision without some 
indication of that fact by the authority with final decision- 
making power. 
The Court found the critical issue in the instant case to be 
whether Regional Board reports and Division reports were "pre- 
decisional memoranda prepared in order to assist a decision- 
maker in arriving at his decision, which are exempt from disclo- 
sure," or "postdecisional memoranda setting forth the reasons for 
an agency decision already made, which are Neither Divi- 
sions of the Board nor Regional Boards had any final decision- 
making power. Regional Board reports and Division reports were 
prepared prior to decisions and used in the consultative process. 
30. 450 F.2d at 708. 
31. 473 F.2d 109 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
32. Id. at 115. 
33. See notes 24-29 and accompanying text supra. 
34. 421 U.S. at 184. 
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There was no evidence that the reasoning of the Regional Board 
reports or Division reports was adopted, although their conclu- 
sions might have been. For these reasons, the Court held that 
Regional Board reports and Division reports were not final opin- 
ions that would have to be disclosed; rather, they constituted 
predecisional consultative memoranda protected by exemption 
5 .3" 
In reaching its holding, the Court considered and rejected 
several arguments advanced by the plaintiff, including the argu- 
ment that the status of Regional Boards was analogous to that of 
federal district courts which issue opinions subject to review by 
circuit courts of appeal; opinions of Regional Boards, therefore, 
like those of district courts, should be made public. In rejecting 
this argument, the court indicated that whereas the decision of a 
district court has operative effect independent of appellate court 
review, the recommendation of a Regional Board has no operative 
effect independent of full Board consideration. Regional Board 
reports, unlike district court opinions, are therefore advisory and 
thus exempt from dis~losure.~~ 
The Court also rejected the plaintiffs argument that Re- 
gional Boards are agencies for the purposes of the FOIA and that, 
as the final products of agencies, Regional Board reports are sub- 
ject to disclosure. Whether Regional Boards are agencies or not, 
the Court found that exemption 5 applies to Regional Board re- 
ports. Exemption 5 does not distinguish between intra-agency 
and inter-agency mem~randa.~' In either case, the Court decided 
that memoranda such as Regional Board reports, which express 
the advisory opinions of a body with no final decision-making 
power, are protected by exemption 5? 
Finally, the Court rejected plaintiffs argument that, because 
those who prepare Division reports are members of the full Board, 
Division reports are not exempt from di~closure.~~ The Court 
noted that neither the reasoning nor the recommendations of Di- 
vision reports are binding on the full Board and recognized the 
possibility that drafters of Division reports might change their 
minds after full Board discussion. The consultative function and 
non-binding effect of Division reports therefore brought them 
within the scope of exemption 5. 
35. Id. at  186, 189. 
36. Id. at 186. 
37. See note 11 supra. 
38. 421 U S .  at 187. 
39. Id. at 189-90. 
CASE NOTES 
A. Dependence on  Voluntary Agency Disclosure 
The instant case demonstrates the impossibility of the courts 
framing a rule that  will identify, absent clear indications by 
agency decision makers, all memoranda containing official ex- 
planations for agency decisions. The holding that the reports a t  
issue in the instant case should not be disclosed was based on the 
Court's determination that "the evidence utterly fails to support 
the conclusion that the reasoning in the Reports is adopted by the 
Board as its reasoning, even when it agrees with the conclusion 
of a Report . . . ."40 AS a practical matter, evidence of an 
agency's reasons for a decision can only come from the agency 
itself. Not surprisingly, the Board's failure or refusal to indicate 
that the reports at  issue contained official explanations for its 
decisions resulted in the Court's conclusion that the evidence was 
insufficient to require disclosure. Clearly, in any similar case, 
only indications from a decision maker will constitute adequate 
evidence of reasons for decisions. 
As a consequence of the courts' inability to identify, without 
the aid of decision makers, memoranda that contain explanations 
for agency decisions, some memoranda that ought to be disclosed 
as final opinions under the FOIA will likely remain sheltered from 
public scrutiny. For example, assume that  only advisory memo- 
randa are written by an agency during its adjudicative proceed- 
ings but that some of these memoranda contain official explana- 
tions for decisions. Under the FOIA, the public would be entitled 
to examine memoranda in the latter class.41 Nevertheless, be- 
cause of judicial inability to frame a rule which will identify such 
memoranda without indications of their nature by agencies, these 
memoranda will not be made public unless the agency voluntarily 
indicates that they express official policy. Thus, when dealing 
with agencies such as the Renegotiation Board, which are not 
usually required to provide final opinions for their decisions," the 
40. Id. a t  184. 
41. See notes 20 & 23 and accompanying text supra. 
42. The Board is required to supply opinions only when requested by contractors: 
Whenever the Board makes a determination with respect to the amount of 
excessive profits, and such determination is made by order, it shall, a t  the 
request of the contractor or subcontractor, as the case may be, prepare and 
furnish such contractor with a statement of such determination, of the facts 
used as a basis therefore, and of its reasons for such determination. 
50 U.S.C. $ 1215(a) (1970). 
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public is dependent on agency sensitivity to public information 
needs and on agency inclination to voluntarily satisfy those 
needs.43 
B. Agency Regulations as a Possible Solution 
Promulgation of amendments to regulations governing the 
Renegotiation Board to require more information is a possible 
means of eliminating dependence on voluntary production of in- 
formation by the Board. Indeed, during the course of the pre- 
Supreme Court litigation in the instant case, the Board amended 
its regulations "in an endeavor to provide contractors and the 
public with more information regarding the basis for findings and 
determinations in renegotiation  proceeding^."^^ Opinions are now 
routinely written to provide explanations for most orders issued 
by the Board or by Regional Boards in exercise of their delegated 
a~thor i ty .~"  
Despite the well-intentioned efforts of the Board, however, 
the regulatory solution in general and the new regulations in par- 
ticular are inadequate. First, the new regulations allow the Board 
not to provide opinions in certain circum~tances.~~ Consequently, 
all Board decisions will not be explained. Second, the Renegotia- 
tion Act, pursuant to which regulations governing the Board are 
promulgated, requires opinions only when requested by contrac- 
t o r ~ . ~ '  Therefore, regulations promulgated pursuant to the Act 
need only require opinions when requested by contractors. 
Hence, the circumstances in which opinions will not be written 
under the new regulations may expand to include all those where 
no requests for opinions are made by contractors. Were this to 
43. "It is important to remember that the FOIA is a unique statute, since its spirit 
encourages government officials to display an 'obedience to the unenforceable.' " Nader, 
Freedom from Information: The Act and the Agencies, 5 HARV. CIV. RIGHTS-CIV. LIB. L. 
REV. 1, 2 (1970). 
44. 19 RENEGOTIATION BD. ANN. REP. 6 (1974) [hereinafter cited as BD. REP.]. 
45. 32 C.F.R. 4 1472.3(k)(4)(iii) (1975) provides for a Proposed Opinion to accompany 
the Regional Board's notice of finding excessive profits. 32 C.F.R. 4 1472.3(b) (1975) 
provides that Regional Boards will issue contractors Regional Board Opinions in cases 
where the Regional Board makes a recommendation to the Renegotiation Board. 32 C.F.R. 
4 1475.4 (1975) requires the Board to furnish contractors with Final Opinions upon issu- 
ance of unilateral orders. Additional regulations describe other circumstances under which 
opinions are to be issued. 
46. 32 C.F.R. 4 1475.2 (1975) allows the Board to waive or modify opinion-writing 
procedures when the contractor fails to file a Standard Form of Contractor's Report or 
other necessary information requested by the Renegotiation Board or a Regional Board, 
or "if the interests of the Government otherwise so require." 
47. 50 U.S.C. 4 1215(a) (1970). See note 42 supra. 
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occur, the Board would prepare opinions with no more frequency 
than it did prior to the new regulations. Third, and this is perhaps 
the gravest deficiency in the regulatory solution, the Board may 
again amend its regulations to meet only the barest demands of 
the Renegotiation In short, promulgation of regulations 
alone is likely to prove inadequate as a means of providing infor- 
mation needed by the public. 
C. The Statutory Solution 
Statutory amendment will remedy the current information 
problem. There simply is no legal way of circumventing a statute 
that unambiguously requires opinions to be written in all cases. 
Nevertheless, before imposing such a statute on the Renegotia- 
tion Board (or any other agency), two determinations must be 
made. First, it must be found that the cost of requiring opinions 
in all cases is justifiable. Second, it must be decided which stat- 
ute can most appropriately be amended to require opinion writ- 
ing. 
1. Measuring the costs and benefits of written opinions 
The nature of Board proceedings makes information concern- 
ing excessive profits determinations important to the public. 
Renegotiation proceedings can correctly be termed negotiations 
only when contractors agree with the Board; otherwise the Board 
unilaterally issues orders to return excessive profits.49 These or- 
ders are based on six vague statutory guidelines." Without a 
48. The Board, in its enlightened self-interest, may have decided that enacting its 
own opinion writing regulations would be an effective method of forestalling any move by 
the Congress to impose strict procedural requirements upon it. But the Board may just 
as easily eliminate that provision, leaving contractors in their undesireable pre-regulation 
position. 
49. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT, 8 16.09, a t  339 (3d ed. 1972). 
50. 50 U.S.C. App. § 1213(e) (1970) provides in part: 
In determining excessive profits favorable recognition must be given to the 
efficiency of the contractor or subcontractor, with particular regard to attain- 
ment of quantity and quality production, reduction of costs, and economy in the 
use of materials, facilities, and manpower; and in addition, there shall be taken 
into consideration the following factors: 
(1) Reasonableness of costs and profits, with particular regard to 
volume of production, normal earnings, and comparison of war and 
peacetime products; 
(2) The net worth, with particular regard to the amount and source 
of public and private capital employed; 
(3) Extent of risk assumed, including the risk incident to reasonable 
pricing policies; 
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collection of opinions applying and interpreting those guidelines, 
contractors are at  a serious negotiating disadvantage. They can- 
not argue based on precedent, and thus are somewhat a t  the 
mercy of the Board's ad hoc determinations. Although contrac- 
tors are protected by the right of de novo trial in the Court of 
 claim^,^' such protection does not justify a lack of procedural 
fairness in agency adjudicative proceedings. Finally, without ade- 
quate information concerning grounds for Board decisions, con- 
tractors are confronted with exactly the kind of situation the 
FOIA was designed to eliminate, one in which citizens are unsure 
of the grounds for government action that may be taken against 
them.52 
Explanations of all prior Board orders will provide more cer- 
tainty concerning the Board's grounds for decisions, and thereby 
help increase the fairness of the renegotiation process. First, the 
resultant case law will impose increased pressure on the Board to 
be consistent in its Confronted with case law, the Board 
will arguably be more hesitant to deviate from prior decisions 
without compelling reasons. Second, contractors, able to rely on 
explanations of prior decisions, will be in a more equal bargaining 
position, since the Board will have less opportunity to be arbi- 
trary. Third, explanations will provide more rational bases for the 
decisions of contractors either to accept excessive profits determi- 
nations or to seek review in the Court of Claims.54 Contractors 
therefore will be more likely to seek review when Board decisions 
seem erroneous or interpret uncertain points of law. They will 
likewise be less likely to make futile appeals. 
In view of the public's need for the information that explana- 
tions would provide, the cost of producing them is not great. 
(4) Nature and extent of contribution to the defense effort, including 
inventive and developmental contribution and cooperation with the 
Government and other contractors in supplying technical assistance; 
(5) Character of business, including source and nature of materials, 
complexity of manufacturing technique, character and extent of sub- 
contracting, and rate of turn-over; 
(6) Such other factors the consideration of which the public interest 
and fair and equitable dealing may require, which factors shall be 
published in the regulations of the Board from time to time as 
adopted. 
51. 50 U.S.C. App. 4 1218 (Supp. IV, 1974), amending 50 U.S.C. App. 4 1218 (1970) 
(which had provided for review by the Tax Court). 
52. See note 21 and accompanying text supra. See also Renegotiation Bd. v. Banner- 
craft Clothing Co., Inc., 415 U.S. 1, 33 (Douglas, J. dissenting). 
53. See note 22 and accompanying text supra. 
54. See 415 U.S. a t  33. 
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During fiscal year 1974 the Board made 153 excessive profits de- 
terminations, totalling $70,207,586.55 It incurred expenses of 
$4,684,204." The cost of 153 opinions would seem to be justifiable 
in view of the overall expenses of the Board, the amount of money 
it recovers, and the importance of the public's interest in provid- 
ing explanations to contractors for excessive profits determina- 
tions. 
2. Amending the appropriate statute 
Three statutes are relevant to the production of information 
by the Renegotiation Board-the FOIA, the APA, and the Rene- 
gotiation Act. In considering the functions of these statutes, i t  is 
clear that the simplest way of imposing an opinion-writing re- 
quirement on the Board is to amend the Renegotiation Act. The 
FOIA cannot as appropriately be amended, since its purpose is 
not to require opinions to be written, but to require disclosure of 
those that are written.57 The APA is likewise not a desirable vehi- 
cle for the change, since the Board is exempted from its opinion- 
writing  provision^.^^ Even without the exemption, however, the 
APA would not apply to the Board because that statute does not 
require opinions to explain decisions which result from informal 
adjudicative proceedings such as those employed by the BoardaS9 
Therefore, the only way to correct the information deficiency 
pointed out by the instant case, without a t  the same time altering 
the Board's adjudicative  procedure^,^^ is to add a provision to the 
55. BD. REP. 11. 
56. Id. a t  18. 
57. 421 U.S. a t  191. 
58. 50 U.S.C. App. § 1221 (1970). 
59. The opinion-writing section of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 557, does not apply to agency 
decisions, such as those made by the Board, which are not required by statute to be 
reached after agency hearings and are subject to de novo review. 5 U.S.C. 554(a) (1970). 
60. If the Board were to adopt formal adjudicative proceedings and the exemption 
from the opinion-writing provisions of the APA did not exist, the Board would be required 
under the APA to write opinions. Changing the Board's procedures does not appear to be 
a likely possibility a t  the present time, however, as the following colloquy between Con- 
gressman Corman and Board Chairman Whitehead during hearings concerning extension 
of the Renegotiation Act demonstrates: 
Mr. Corman: How would you feel about a statutory requirement that [a con- 
tractor] be given due process a t  some point in this procedure? 
Mr. Whitehead: I wouldn't be in favor of getting involved a t  this late date in 
the administrative procedures process. I think perhaps if that had been wise 
initially or when the 1951 act was created, established, and enacted, it would 
have been given some serious consideration, and it no doubt was. The legislative 
history would probably prove this. At this particular time it would increase our 
280 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1976: 
Renegotiation Act requiring opinions with all Board orders. 
To add such a provision to the Renegotiation Act would be a 
relatively simple matter. As previously indicated, the Act already 
contains a provision requiring opinions in some  instance^.^' This 
provision merely needs to be amended to require opinions in all 
cases. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The instant case leads to two conclusions that may be more 
important in general than in the specific context of information 
production by the Renegotiation Board. First, the impossibility 
of determining when memoranda contain agency policy without 
specific agency indications to that effect demonstrates that the 
FOIA will work as intended only if agencies comply voluntarily. 
Second, FOIA litigation is likely, as in the instant case, to demon- 
strate public information needs that cannot be fulfilled under the 
provisions of existing law. Congress should be alert to such unmet 
but valid needs and respond by making the necessary statutory 
adjustments. Otherwise, the FOIA's job will remain unfinished. 
budget very substantially. I have never heard great beefing about or complaint 
about the lack of due process on the part of contractors in our prcoedures [sic] 
. . . . 
Mr. Corman: I am not a t  all eager to make it  harder for you to do your job. 
(There were no follow up questions.) Hearing on Extension of the Renegotiation Act Before 
the House Committee on Ways and Means, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 13, May 14, 1974. 
61. 50 U.S.C. App. § 1215(a) (1970). 
